Can migration reduce educational attainment ? Evidence from Mexico by McKenzie, David & Rapoport, Hillel
  1
Can migration reduce educational attainment? 
Evidence from Mexico
  * 
David McKenzie
a and Hillel Rapoport
b 
a Development Research Group, World Bank  
b Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, CADRE, University of Lille II, 
and Stanford Center for International Development 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the impact of migration on educational attainment in rural 
Mexico. Using historical migration rates by state to instrument for current migration, 
we find evidence of a significant negative effect of migration on schooling attendance 
and attainment of 12 to 18 year-old boys and 16 to 18 year-old girls. IV-Censored 
Ordered Probit results show that living in a migrant household lowers the chances of 
boys completing junior high school and of boys and girls completing high school. The 
negative effect of migration on schooling is somewhat mitigated for younger girls 
with low educated mothers, which is consistent with remittances relaxing credit 
constraints on education investment for the very poor. However, for the majority of 
rural Mexican children, family migration depresses educational attainment. 
Comparison of the marginal effects of migration on school attendance and on 
participation in other activities shows that the observed decrease in schooling of 16 to 
18 year-olds is accounted for by the current migration of boys and increased 
housework for girls. 
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The rapid growth in migrants’ remittances has triggered considerable attention in 
policy circles (e.g. GCIM 2005, World Bank 2005) and has led to renewed research 
attention to the development impacts of remittances.
 1   Several recent empirical 
studies have emphasized the potential for remittance transfers to alleviate credit 
constraints and thereby increase educational attainment of children in migrant 
families.
2 The recent theoretical literature on the “beneficial brain drain” or “brain 
gain” suggests a second channel through which migration can increase educational 
attainment. The basic idea of such theories is that education has a high return when 
migrating, and so the prospect of migrating in the future raises the expected return to 
education, inducing higher domestic enrollment in schools.
3 
However, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) have shown that the return to education 
is higher in Mexico than for Mexican migrants in the United States. This arises due to 
higher inequality in Mexico than in the U.S., and additionally from the fact that most 
first-time migration from rural Mexico is illegal, leading only to job opportunities 
with low formal educational requirements. As a result, the incentive effect of the 
prospect of future migration for children growing up in migrant households in Mexico 
may actually lower the incentive to invest in education, counteracting the remittances 
effect. 
The implicit assumption in most of the existing studies of remittances is that 
migration only affects educational outcomes through remittances, and not through any 
                                                  
1 See the recent survey of Rapoport and Docquier (2006), which provides an extensive discussion of  
different motives for remitting. 
2 See Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) for Nicaragua, Lopez-Cordoba (2004) for Mexico and Yang 
(2004) for the Philippines. 
3 See for example Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004) for a review of the various channels 
through which a beneficial brain drain can be obtained.   3
other channel such as this incentive effect.
 4  However, in addition to the potential 
incentive effect, migration of a family member may have a number of other effects on 
child schooling. For example, parental absence as a result of migration may translate 
into less parental inputs into education acquisition and may also require remaining 
children to undertake housework or work to help meeting short-term labor and cash 
shortages. If any of these other channels operate, studies which focus just on the effect 
of remittances will generally give biased estimates
5.  
This paper therefore focuses on identifying the overall impact of migration on 
educational attainment in Mexico, estimating the net impact of these various effects. 
Every fifth household in rural Mexico has at least one member with international 
migration experience,
6 so the impacts of migration on the next generation are 
potentially very large. We use historical migration networks formed by 1920 as an 
instrument for migration seven decades later in order to account for the potential 
endogeneity of household migration decisions. Our main finding is that living in a 
household with migration experience depresses the educational attainment of rural 
Mexican children, with a stronger effect on 16 to 18 year-olds.  
We begin with bivariate probit models of school attendance, which reveal 
large negative effects of being in a migrant household on school attendance of 16 to 
18 year-old males and females, and on 12 to 15 year-old males, with insignificant 
results for 12 to 15 year-old females. Estimation of two-stage least squares models of 
                                                  
4 See the appendix in McKenzie (2005) for a methodological discussion of this point. 
5 Theoretically one could separate the effect of remittances from other effects of migration through the 
use of a valid instrument which predicts whether or not one migrant will send more remittances than 
another. Such instruments are uncommon in practice, with the exchange rate shocks used by Yang 
(2004) coming closest in this regard among the existing literature (although as he acknowledges, these 
shocks also affect migrant wealth holdings). 
6 Source: own calculations from ENADID data (see Table 1).   4
completed years of schooling then reveals negative effects of migration on 16 to 18 
year-olds, and insignificant effects on 12 to 15 year-olds.  
However, a high proportion of 12 to 15 year-olds are still in school. Mexico’s 
education system provides for nine grades of compulsory schooling, and so it is not 
until the age of 15 or 16 that children and their families begin making decisions about 
completion of non-compulsory grades. We allow for this censoring of attained 
education for children still in school, and for the potential nonlinearities in grade 
progression probabilities caused by natural stopping points such as the end of junior 
high (9
th grade). This occurs through estimation of an instrumented censored ordered 
probit model. Doing this reveals a significant negative effect of migration on 
educational attainment of 12 to 15 year-old males, and increases the size of the 
estimated effects for 16 to 18 year-olds. Overall, living in a migrant household is 
estimated to lower the probability of completing high school by 13 percent for males 
and 14 percent for females.  
We then allow for heterogeneity in the effects of migration by interacting 
household migration status with maternal education, a proxy for wealth. We find 
marginally significant evidence for less negative effects of migration on educational 
attainment for children in poorer households, which is consistent with remittances 
relaxing credit constraints. However, the overall effect of migration on education is 
still negative for 16 to 18 year-olds, even in poor households.  When we explore the 
channels for this depressive effect of migration on schooling, we find the majority of 
the effect can be explained by young males in migrant households themselves 
migrating instead of attending school, and young females in migrant households 
dropping out of school to engage in housework.   5
In related work, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) also estimate the overall impact 
of migration on education in Mexico. They use the 2000 Mexican census, and look at 
the impact on number of school grades completed of 10 to 15 year-olds. Their main 
finding is that migration to the U.S. is associated with more years of completed 
education for 13 to 15 year-old girls, but only for those whose mothers have three 
years or less of education.  We employ a large demographic survey instead of the 
Census, allowing us to consider a broader measure of household migration 
experience. We obtain an insignificant effect of migration on education for 12 to 15 
year-olds girls with poorly educated mothers, and can not reject positive effects of 
similar magnitudes to those they find. However, our work builds on their findings in 
three important respects. Most fundamentally, we consider 16 to 18 year-olds, who 
are at the age when migration for work starts to become a possibility, especially for 
males, and who are also at the age when they may be entrusted with household 
responsibilities which take the place of schooling. That is, this is precisely the age 
range at which many of the other channels through which migration affects education 
start to manifest themselves. 
Secondly, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) note that school attendance is high 
amongst their sample, with 82.5 percent of 10-15 year-olds attending school. 
Nevertheless, they use two-stage least squares for estimation, which does not account 
for this high rate of right-censoring.  Once we do this, insignificant 2SLS results for 
12 to 15 year-old males become significant.  Finally, the survey we use enables 
examination of what children are doing when they are not in school, enabling 
investigation of the channels through which migration is affecting schooling. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
demographic survey data used for the empirical analysis and contrasts it to the 2000   6
Mexican Census. Section 3 discusses our identification strategy and other 
econometric issues such as censoring and the presence of nonlinearities in education 
decisions. Section 4 provides a broad theoretical framework that outlines how the 
main effects of migration on the feasible and desired amounts of education balance 
out at different wealth levels. The results on school attendance and education 
attainments are presented in Section 5. Section 6 then asks what children in migrant 
households are doing instead of going to school and  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
This paper uses data from the 1997 Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica 
(ENADID) (National Survey of Demographic Dynamics) conducted by Mexico’s 
national statistical agency (INEGI) in the last quarter of 1997.
7 The ENADID is a 
large nationally representative demographic survey, with approximately 2000 
households surveyed in each state, resulting in a total sample of 73,412 households. 
We restrict our analysis to rural communities, defined here to be municipalities which 
are outside of cities of population 50,000 or more. Our main results are robust to 
lowering this threshold to cities with population below 15,000. Within these 
communities we have a sample of 20,388 children aged 12 to 18 years, living in 
12,980 households. 
The key variables of interest are migration and schooling. The ENADID asks 
several questions concerning migration, including whether household members have 
ever been to the United States in search of work. This question is asked of all 
household members who normally live in the household, even if they are temporarily 
studying or working elsewhere. Additional questions ask whether any household 
                                                  
7 Survey methodology, summary tables, and questionnaires are contained in INEGI (1999).   7
members have gone to live in another country in the past five years, capturing 
migration for study or other non-work purposes in addition to work related migration. 
We define a child as living in a migrant household if the household has a member 
aged 19 and over who has ever been to the U.S. to work, or who has moved to the 
U.S. in the last five years for any other reason. The migrant member or members may 
have returned to Mexico or still be in the U.S. at the time of the survey. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. 
Twenty two percent of all households in our sample with a child aged 12 to 18 have 
an adult member who has ever migrated to the U.S. Several recent studies of 
migration and schooling in Mexico have used the 2000 Mexican Census (Hanson and 
Woodruff, 2003; Lopez-Cordoba, 2004). The Mexican Census only asks about 
migration within the last five years. The ENADID questions on migration within the 
last five years are identically worded to the Census, and so for comparison we also 
calculate the proportion of households with migrants according to the Census 
definition.  Table 1 shows that relying on the Census questions to define migrant 
status understates the proportion of households with migrant experience by almost 
fifty percent.  
Examining migration within the last five years is likely not to be unduly 
restrictive for certain types of analysis. However, there are number of reasons to 
prefer looking at whether household members have ever migrated in examining the 
impact of migration on education. Schooling is a cumulative process, with each year 
building on the year before. Any impact of migration on schooling during the years of 
primary education may therefore affect schooling six to ten years later. A portion of 
this effect may be at the extensive margin: 10 percent of 12 year-olds in our sample 
are not currently attending school, which makes it likely they will not be attending   8
school at age 18. There are also likely to be effects at the intensive margin, whereby 
household resources and effort devoted to schooling during primary school affect the 
ability of children to continue schooling in later years. In addition to these direct 
effects through prior schooling, migration by household members six or more years 
ago may still result in higher household wealth today, influencing the ability to pay 
for schooling later on. Furthermore, schooling decisions may depend on the 
expectation of migration in the future. This expectation will depend in part on 
previous household migration experience, whether or not the migration episodes 
occurred within the last five years. For these reasons we prefer the ENADID to the 
Census for examining the effects of migration on education. 
The ENADID asks migrants who have ever been to the U.S. for work a set of 
additional questions about their migrant experience, including the number of trips 
they have ever made, and whether they had legal documentation to work. 
Approximately 50 percent of all migrants have made more than one trip, with a mean 
of 2.8 trips per migrant. The vast majority of migrants in our sample had no legal 
documentation to work, especially on their first trip. Over 91 percent of first-time 
migrants who went to work in the U.S. had no legal documentation to do so. This is 
important to note, as it indicates that the majority of Mexicans in our sample 
contemplating migration are likely to end up working without documentation in the 
United States. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) find evidence from an amnesty 
program that the returns to human capital are higher for legal workers than for illegal 
workers in the United States. This corroborates our conjecture that migration lowers 
the incentives to acquire education for prospective Mexican immigrants.
8 
                                                  
8 See also Rivera-Batiz (1999).   9
Our main measure of education is based on years of schooling attained by 
children and adults. Elementary education (grades 1 to 6) is compulsory in Mexico 
and is normally provided to children aged 6 to 14. Lower secondary education (grades 
7 to 9) became compulsory in 1993 and is generally given to children aged 12 to 16 
years who have completed elementary education. This is followed by three years of 
upper secondary schooling (grades 10 to 12) and higher studies. Despite education 
being compulsory, there is still far from complete compliance and a lack of 
infrastructure in some remote rural areas (SEP, 1999). Approximately half of all 15 
year-olds with less than 9 years of attained schooling were not attending school in 
1997. We focus our study on children aged 12 to 18, the ages at which children will 
be receiving the majority of their post-primary education, and the age range at which 
children start leaving school. 90 percent of 12 year-old males and 83 percent of 12 
year-old females in our sample were attending school in 1997, compared to 51 and 47 
percent of 15 year-old males and females, and 20 and 16 percent of 18 year-olds. 
Figure 1 plots the proportion of females and males attending school by age 
and the migrant status of their households, along with mean years of schooling 
attained by age. The raw data show school attendance is higher in migrant households 
among young children of five or six years, and similar in migrant and non-migrant 
households in the early teenage years. However, school attendance drops among boys 
in migrant households relative to non-migrant households from age 14 onward. The 
result of this is that mean schooling levels attained for boys are very similar in 
migrant and non-migrant households, while girls in migrant households have higher 
mean schooling levels as they age than girls in non-migrant households. However, 
these are unconditional differences, and do not take account of other differences   10
between migrant and non-migrant households which also affect schooling. We turn to 
this issue next. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology and Identification Strategy 
3.1. Identification 
The first challenge in estimating the causal impact of migration on education 
outcomes is the possibility of unobserved characteristics of households which 
influence their decision to migrate also playing a role in their schooling decisions. For 
example, parents who care more strongly about the education of their children may 
migrate in order to earn income that can be used to pay for schooling expenses, and 
will also devote more attention and non-income resources to improving schooling 
outcomes of their children. A simple comparison of migrants and non-migrants would 
in this case overstate the education gains from migration. Alternatively, Hanson and 
Woodruff (2003) note that negative labor market shocks experienced by parents may 
both induce migration and require children to work instead of spending time in 
school, leading to a spurious negative relationship between migration and years of 
schooling. As such the direction of any selectivity bias is theoretically uncertain.  
We therefore follow Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) and a number of 
subsequent studies
9 in using historic state-level migration rates as an instrument for 
current migration stocks. In particular, we use the U.S. migration rate from 1924 for 
the state in which the household is located, taken from Foerster (1925)
10. Since this 
instrument only varies at the state level, we cluster our standard errors at the state 
                                                  
9 Hanson and Woodruff (2003); McKenzie and Rapoport (2004); López-Córdoba (2004); and 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2004) all employ historic migration rates as instruments for current 
migration.  
10 Thanks to Chris Woodruff for supplying these historic rates.   11
level to allow for arbitrary correlation in the error structure of individuals within a 
state.  These historic rates can be argued to be the result of the pattern of arrival of the 
railroad system in Mexico coupled with changes in U.S. demand conditions for 
agricultural labor. As migration networks lower the cost of migration for future 
migrants, they become self-perpetuating, and as a result, continue to influence the 
migration decisions of households today.  
Our identifying assumption is then that historic state migration rates do not 
affect education outcomes over 70 years later, apart from their influence through 
current migration. Instrumental variables estimation relies on this exogeneity 
assumption, and so it is important to consider and counteract potential threats to its 
validity. One potential threat is that historic levels of inequality and historic schooling 
levels helped determine migration rates in response to the railroad expansion, and also 
influence current levels of schooling due to intergenerational transmission of 
schooling. To allow for this possibility we control for a number of historic variables at 
around the same time period as our historic migration measure. The controls are the 
proportion of rural households owning land by state in 1910 taken from McBride 
(1923)
11; and the number of schools per 1000 population by state in 1930, and male 
and female school attendance for 6 to 10 year-olds by state for 1930, both taken from 
DGE (1941).   
A second possible threat to validity is that the development of the railroads in 
certain states and communities ushered in the subsequent development of other 
infrastructure, such as school facilities, and led to changes in the income distribution 
which themselves influenced the incentives and ability to invest in schooling. We 
include the following state-level controls for this possibility, all calculated from the 
                                                  
11 Land ownership data were kindly provided by Ernesto López-Córdoba.   12
public use sample of the 1960 Mexican Census: the Gini of household income, the 
Gini of years of schooling accumulated for males and females aged 15-20, and the 
average levels of years of schooling accumulated for males and females aged 15-20. 
Spearman rank-order correlation tests do indeed indicate some significant correlations 
between the 1924 migration rates and some of these controls: states with higher 
historic migration rates had higher average rates of schooling and lower inequality in 
schooling in 1960. This might represent the influence of migration over the 1924-60 
period, or the effects of concomitant trends, and so we prefer to include these 1960 
education inequality and levels as controls. Even after controlling for these variables, 
historic migration rates remain a powerful predictor of current community migration 
prevalence, with a first-stage F-statistic of 28. 
A final threat to the validity of this instrument is the possibility that the 
historic community migration network has a direct effect on educational attainment 
through changing the incentives to acquire education. We argue that the incentive 
effects should be much stronger if children have a household member who has 
previously migrated than if they merely have someone in their community who has 
migrated, so that the direct effect of the community network is likely to be second-
order in the education decision. As a check on this assumption, we split states into 
those above and below the median migration rate in 1924, and then regress years of 
schooling on a dummy variable for being in a high migration state for children in non-
migrant households. Table 2 shows the effect of the community network is 
insignificant for three out of the four groups, and has a small positive effect on school 
attainment of 12 to 15 year-old females. This provides us with further confidence in 
our instrument and suggests that a finding of migration lowering education rates is not 
a result of the community network directly lowering education rates.   13
3.2. Estimation techniques 
The first outcome of interest that we study is whether children are currently attending 
school. As this is a binary outcome, we use maximum-likelihood to estimate a 
bivariate probit model, following Newey (1987), which we will follow common 
practice in referring to as the IV-Probit model.
12  The marginal effects of this model 
will then be compared to marginal effects from standard probit estimation. However, 
current school attendance does not allow for possible delays in starting schooling, 
catch-up and grade repetition. As seen in Figure 1, it appears that children in migrant 
households are slightly more likely to start school at age 5 than children in non-
migrant households. Therefore greater attendance in non-migrant households at older 
ages may just be the result of these late starters catching up. 
  Instead of school attendance, we therefore focus most of our attention on 
educational attainment, measured by the grade-years of schooling attained by 
children. Following Hanson and Woodruff (2003) we begin with two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) of the following equation: 
Schoolingi = α+β*Migranti+δ’Xi +εi      (1), 
where Schoolingi is the years of schooling attained by child i, Migranti is a dummy 
variable taking the value one if a household has a migrant member and zero 
otherwise, and Xi is a set of individual and community controls.  
  However, there are several features of education data that render OLS and 
2SLS analysis inappropriate. Ideally one would like to observe the final level of 
schooling completed by individuals and relate it to the migrant status of the household 
in which they grew up. Here we face the problem that while schooling is complete for 
                                                  
12 Estimation was carried out using the IVProbit command in STATA version 9.   14
adults, we have no information on the households in which they lived during their 
childhood, or on the migration status of their parents. We must therefore restrict our 
sample to children of school age. However, while we have information on the 
migration status of the households in which these children are living, many of them 
are still attending school and so we do not observe their completed level of schooling.  
  The data are thus right-censored for children who are attending school. OLS 
and 2SLS estimation ignores this censoring, treating the educational attainment of 
children still in school as identical to those who have finished schooling. This results 
in biased estimates of the impact of migration on final schooling attainment. 
Censoring is likely to be especially important for schooling outcomes of 12 to 15 
year-olds, since many in this age group will not have finished schooling. 
A second issue is that OLS and 2SLS assume a continuous distribution for the 
dependent variable, years of schooling attained. However, as seen in Figure 2, the 
observed schooling distribution is characterized by large spikes at 6 years and 9 years, 
representing the completion of primary and lower secondary school. As noted in the 
education literature (see e.g., Glick and Sahn, 2000), grade attainment is the outcome 
of a series of ordered discrete choices. The choice to continue onto junior secondary 
school or onto high school for one year is thus likely to be different from the choice to 
continue for an extra year once one has started junior high or high school.  
  As a result of these features of education grade data, King and Lillard (1987) 
and subsequent studies in the economics of education literature (e.g. Glick and Sahn 
(2000), Holmes (2003), Maitra (2003)) have adopted a censored ordered probit 
framework when examining the impact of household characteristics on schooling. In 
this framework, an individual’s desired latent propensity for schooling, yi is 
determined by a linear relationship analogous to equation (1):   15
 yi = α+β*Migranti+δ’Xi +εi         ( 2 )  
 However,  yi is unobserved. For individuals who have finished their schooling, 
we observe schooling level S if the value of yi  falls between two cut-off points, 
corresponding to grades S and S+1: 
1 + ≤ < S i S y μ μ         ( 3 )  
For individuals with no schooling, we only know that the index falls below the lowest 
threshold, normalized to zero, and for individuals with the maximum level of 
schooling, we know only that yi ≥ μmax. We classify education grade attainment into 
seven ordered categories for the purposes of this analysis: no schooling, 1 to 5 years, 
6 years (complete primary), 7 to 8 years, 9 years (completed junior high), 10 to 11 
years, and 12 and above years (completed high school).  Assuming normality of the 
error terms, εi, one can then write down the likelihood function, and via this ordered 
probit model, estimate these cutoff points along with the coefficients of interest (see 
Greene, 2000). For children who are still in school, we know that they will attain at 
least their current grade, and hence that for an individual currently in school with J 
grades of schooling attained, yi ≥ μJ. One can therefore modify the likelihood function 
to allow for this censoring, and estimate the censored ordered probit model via 
maximum-likelihood.
13 
    To allow for the potential endogeneity of household migration status within 
the ordered probit and censored ordered probit model we follow the methodology of 
Rivers and Vuong (1988). In the first stage, a household migrant status is regressed on 
the instrument and exogenous regressors. The fitted values and residuals from this 
first stage are then both included in the censored ordered probit model estimated in 
                                                  
13 See Appendix A of Glick and Sahn (2000) for specification of the likelihood function. Estimation 
was carried by programming the likelihood in STATA version 9.    16
the second stage.
14 We will refer to the estimates from this process as IV-Ordered 
Probit and IV-Censored Ordered Probit estimates. 
 
4. Theoretical framework 
We now turn to an examination of the theoretical impact of migration on the 
schooling of children. Let ri,s denote the present discounted value of the additional 
returns to child i of completing schooling year s, ci,s denote the additional financial 
costs of the child completing this additional year of schooling, and ki,s denote the 
additional non-financial costs of the child completing this additional schooling year, 
such as foregone income and the disutility of school effort. Costs are realized at the 
moment of schooling whereas returns are not realized until the future. Financial costs 
of schooling must therefore be met out of the household’s current resources. The 
household’s schooling decision is then to choose s ∈{0,1,2,…,N} to maximize the net 
present discounted value of schooling, subject to the condition that total financial 
schooling costs must be met out of current household resources net of subsistence 
needs, Ai. That is, 
{} () ∑ ∑
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* . . max arg       (4) 
 Let si
U
 denote the unconstrained optimal level of education for child i, which 
occurs when the financing constraint does not bind. We expect this to be weakly 
increasing in mother’s education and household resources due to the possibility of 
more educated mothers lowering the disutility and non-financial costs of schooling by 
placing higher emphasis on education, helping with schoolwork, and perhaps due to a 
                                                  
14 Such an approach is also carried out by Maitra (2003).   17
genetic ability component. The returns to schooling may also be higher for richer 
households due to peer effects and the ability to enter occupations with high start-up 
costs. Denote by si
P  the maximum possible years of schooling the household can 
afford under its budget constraint. This is clearly increasing in wealth, and is likely to 
be increasing in maternal education since household resources are likely to be 





i i s s s , min
* =           ( 5 )  
Figure 3 then illustrates the relationship between si
* and household wealth levels or 
maternal education. Child schooling is predicted to increase with household resources, 
both due to relaxing of credit constraints and to the possible higher desired levels of 
education for children in richer households with more educated mothers.  
  Now consider the potential impacts of migration on a household’s optimal 
education. Remittances and potentially higher earnings after migration (such as from 
entrepreneurship, see Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001, or farm investments, see Taylor 
and Wyatt, 1996) increase the value of household resources Ai, increasing the 
maximum years of schooling the household can afford, si
P. The relaxation of credit-
constraints allows households to move to or towards their unconstrained optimal level 
of education, resulting in higher education for their children. In contrast, if credit 
constraints are not binding, then remittances will have no effect on their schooling.  
  In addition to remittances, migration can have a number of other effects on 
child schooling. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) note that one potential negative effect 
is that migration may disrupt household structure, removing children from the 
presence of guardians and role models, and require older children to take on 
additional household responsibilities.  In our model this can be thought of as   18
increasing the non-financial costs of schooling, ki,s, leading households to lower si
U, 
their unconstrained level of education.  
  A further effect which we wish to consider is the possibility that due to 
information and network effects, having a migrant parent increases the likelihood that 
the children themselves will become migrants. This may have an immediate 
substitution effect, whereby as a result of the opportunity cost of staying in school 
increasing due to higher potential earnings abroad, children drop out of school in 
order to migrate to work. Again this can be viewed as increasing ki,s, leading 
households to lower si
U. 
Even if children do not migrate at the age when they would be attending 
school, the possibility they may migrate in the future can influence the expected 
returns to education, changing ri,s in our framework. As returns to schooling appear to 
be higher in Mexico than in the United States, the possibility of migration in the 
future will lower the expected returns from migration. Since children of migrants are 
more likely to migrate in the future than children of non-migrants, we would therefore 
expect this incentive effect to lower si
U in migrant households.
15 
  Each of these three additional channels through which migration may affect 
child schooling (disruption of household structure, direct substitution of schooling 
today for migration today, and the change in expected future returns to education) all 
act to lower si
U. Assume first that this reduction in the unconstrained desired level of 
schooling occurs equally across wealth and maternal education levels. Coupling this 
with the increase in si
P arising from remittances gives an overall effect of migration as 
seen in Figure 4. Two possibilities arise. Figure 4a shows the case where the effect of 
                                                  
15 For example, in a survey of students in Zacatecas, Kandel and Kao (2001) find that living in a 
migrant household is negatively associated with directly elicited university aspirations.   19
alleviating credit constraints outweighs the reduction in desired schooling levels for 
the poor, so that child schooling increases in poor households. In contrast, 
unconstrained households only experience the effects of reductions in desired 
schooling, and so schooling falls. Figure 4b shows the case in which the fall in desired 
schooling is sufficiently large that no household would have been credit-constrained, 
even in the absence of remittances. In this case, schooling falls for all wealth levels 
after migration, but still should fall by more for richer households. 
  Nevertheless, under some circumstances one might anticipate seeing more of a 
reduction in schooling among poorer households following migration, and a 
corresponding increase in education inequality. Figure 4c outlines one such scenario. 
Basic education is provided free by the state along with free textbooks (SEP, 1999). 
Along with a number of targeted programs towards the poor, it is likely that even the 
poorest Mexican households have sufficient household resources to afford some years 
of post-primary schooling. It is therefore possible that desired schooling levels lie 
below possible schooling. Migration may then lower si
U by more for poorer 
households than for richer households. Therefore in addition to the overall impact of 
migration on education being uncertain, it is also uncertain as to how the size of the 
effect will vary with wealth. 
5. Results 
5.1. School Attendance 
Table 3 presents the probit and iv-probit estimates of the impact of being in a migrant 
household on school attendance. The probit results show a significant, but small, 
negative impact of being in a migrant household on school attendance of boys, and an 
insignificant effect on school attendance of girls. Once we instrument for migration   20
however, these effects become larger, and being in a migrant household is estimated 
to significantly lower the probability of attending school by 16 percentage points for 
12 to 15 year-old males, 21 percentage points for 16 to 18 year-old males, and 20 
percentage points for 16 to 18 year-old females. The coefficient on migration for 
females aged 12 to 15 is also negative, but is insignificant. All specifications also 
show a strong positive effect of mother’s years of education on school attendance, and 
that children in areas which have historically had more schools are currently more 
likely to attend school.  
 
5.2. Years of Schooling Attained 
Tables 4 to 7 present the results of estimating the impact of being in a migrant 
household on grade years of schooling attained for each sex-age group. In each table, 
Columns 1 and 2 first present the OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (1). Column 3 
gives the ordered probit estimates, and Column 4 gives the iv-ordered probit 
estimates. Column 5 gives the censored ordered probit estimates, while column 6 
adjusts these for endogeneity of migration. 
The OLS results show a positive overall association of migration with attained 
years of schooling, which is significant for females and for males aged 12 to 15. 
However, once we control for the endogeneity of migration, the 2SLS results all show 
a negative impact for migration on schooling, with this effect being significant for 16 
to 18 year-old males and females. Comparison of the OLS and 2SLS results therefore 
suggests that children in migrant households have unobserved characteristics which 
make them more likely to receive schooling than observationally similar children in   21
non-migrant households. This would be consistent with migration of parents who care 
a lot about the education of their children. 
  The iv-ordered probit and iv-censored order probit results show the 
importance of allowing for these more complex specifications. The negative impact of 
migration on education of males aged 12 to 15 is significant in these two 
specifications, compared to the insignificant 2SLS specification. The significance 
level also increases for the negative impact on males and females aged 16 to 18. 
Comparison of the iv-ordered probit and iv-censored ordered probit results shows a 
stronger negative impact of migration after allowing for censoring, with this 
difference greater amongst 12 to 15 year-olds than amongst 16 to 18 year-olds. This 
concurs with our a priori view that censoring was particularly likely to be a problem 
for estimation of schooling at younger ages. The impact of migration on schooling is 
still insignificant for females aged 12 to 15 after allowing for censoring and 
differential schooling level effects.  
The size of the effects can not be easily seen from the coefficients in Tables 4 
to 7. Interpretation of the coefficients of an ordered probit model is complicated by 
the fact that the direction of the effect is only unambiguous for the lowest and highest 
category (see Greene, 2000, p. 878). As a result, we calculate the marginal effect of a 
change in household migrant status on the probability of having schooling of each one 
of our seven categories. Marginal effects can be further complicated in a censored 
model, since a change in a variable of interest will affect both schooling attained at 
the time of observation, and the probability of the observation being censored by the 
child continuing to attend school. We report marginal effects for the change in the 
latent index, which captures both of these effects, and therefore provides an estimate 
of the impact of migrant status on final schooling attainment.   22
Table 8 reports the marginal coefficients from the iv-ordered probit and iv-
censored ordered probit models. These effects demonstrate that living in a migrant 
household has different effects at different levels of schooling, and it is not the case 
that the effects are linear. For example, for 12 to 15 year-old males, the instrumented 
censored order probit model shows that living in a migrant household lowers the 
probability of having 9 years of completed education by 22.5 percent, and lowers the 
probability of having 10 or 11 years of education (or more) by 12 percent. These 
effects are substantially larger than in the ordered probit model which does not allow 
for censoring, reflecting the fact that many 12 to 15 year-olds are still in school. 
Similarly for 15 to 18 year-old males and females, allowing for censoring shows a 
much larger effect of migration on lowering the probability of completing 12 years or 
more education. Overall these marginal effects show migration having very little 
effect on the probability of completing 7 to 8 years of education, while lowering the 
probabilities of receiving more years than this, and increasing the probability of 
receiving less years than this. 
 
5.3. Allowing for heterogeneous effects 
As discussed in Section 4, the impact of migration on education may possibly vary 
with household wealth, since households with lower wealth may be more likely to be 
liquidity constrained when making their education decisions. In such cases, the 
remittance effect of migration is likely to relax these liquidity constraints and 
therefore potentially increase education, or at least not reduce it as much as one sees 
for those with higher wealth levels. Unfortunately the ENADID contains only limited 
information on household wealth, in the form of current asset indicators, which are 
themselves affected by a household’s migration decision. We therefore instead use   23
maternal education as a proxy for household wealth: mother’s years of schooling has 
a 0.46 correlation with an asset index formed as the first principal component of a 
number of asset indicators in our sample. 
Table 9 then reports the results of 2SLS estimation of the impact of living in a 
migrant household on child schooling, interacted with mother’s education. We 
employ two methods of carrying out this interaction. The first is a straight interaction 
with the number of years of schooling. Secondly, we concentrate on the poorest 
segment by interacting with whether or not the child’s mother has two years or less of 
education.  We use 2SLS rather than the censored ordered probit for ease of 
interpreting the coefficients on the interactions, and because the likelihood functions 
did not always converge in ordered probit estimation with interactions.  
  Table 9 offers only limited evidence for heterogeneous effects of migration on 
child’s schooling. The interaction effect with total years of schooling of the mother is 
always negative, indicating that children in households which are likely to be richer 
have even more of a negative impact from migration. However, none of these 
interaction terms are significant. When we interact with the mother having two years 
or less of schooling, we find positive interaction effects, showing that children in 
poorer households are less likely to face a reduction in years of schooling from 
migration. These interaction effects are significant at the 10 percent level for females 
16 to 18 and at the 11 percent level for females 12 to 15. For the 12 to 15 year 
females, the size of the coefficient is almost enough to take the overall effect of 
migration for children with less-educated mothers to zero. Moreover, the standard 
error is such that we can’t reject a positive effect for this group of magnitudes similar 
to the 0.7 years estimated by Hanson and Woodruff (2003). However, for the 16 to 18   24
year-old females, the overall effect of migration is still negative, just less negative 
than for females of this age with more educated mothers. 
6. What are they doing instead of school? 
The above analysis has found that children in migrant households are less likely to be 
attending school and complete less total years of schooling than children in non-
migrant households. In this section we explore what these children are doing instead 
of schooling. It is possible that the absence of a migrant parent may require the child 
to undertake tasks normally carried out by that migrant, such as working in a family 
business or doing housework. Since it can take a while for migrants to start earning 
money and remitting, children may also need to work to cover short-term household 
liquidity constraints.
16 Any of these activities are also consistent with the child (or the 
parents) no longer valuing schooling due to future migration plans. Finally we can 
also examine whether or not the child has migrated during this age range where they 
could be still engaged in schooling. 
Table 10 reports the percentage of 12 to 18 year-olds by sub-age group and 
gender who are in school, working, working and not in school, migrated, doing 
housework, and working in family businesses. Children in migrant households are 
more likely to have migrated themselves than children in non-migrant households, 
especially among males. 3.4 percent of 12 to 15 year-old males and 8.2 percent of 16 
to 18 year-old males with older migrant members in the household have themselves 
migrated, compared to only 0.2 percent of males in non-migrant households. Males 
also are more likely to be working, especially as unpaid workers in family businesses, 
                                                  
16 The ENADID asks whether or not you have worked in the past week, regardless of whether or not 
you are also attending school, which we define as working. Another possible activity in the last week 
for individuals who were not students and who were not working was doing housework.  Among the 
individuals who are working, we also look more closely to see whether or not they are working as 
unpaid workers in a family enterprise, defined as unpaid family workers.   25
if they are in migrant households. In contrast, women in migrant households are not 
that likely to migrate themselves, and instead are more likely to be engaged in 
housework than women in non-migrant households. 
In Table 11 we examine whether the differences observed in Table 10 are 
significant once we control for observable differences between children in migrant 
and non-migrant households and control for the endogeneity of migration. We present 
probit results for whether or not the child has migrated, since the historic migrant 
network instrument is clearly not excludable from this model. For the other outcomes, 
we again instrument living in a migrant household with historic migration rates, using 
iv-probit models. The results show children living in migrant households to be 
significantly more likely to migrate themselves than observationally similar children 
living in non-migrant households. This effect is largest for 16 to 18 year-old males, 
who are 7.3 percent more likely to migrate when living in migrant households. 
Migrant and non-migrant males do not exhibit significantly different probabilities of 
working or engaging in housework, and the higher likelihood of working in family 
businesses observed for males in migrant households in Table 10 is not significant. 
Among females, we see a strong significant effect of living in a migrant household on 
doing housework. 
  How much then do these other activities explain the lower school participation 
of children in migrant households? Comparing the marginal effects of migration on 
school attendance in Table 3 to those on participation in these other activities in Table 
11 shows that current migration can more than account for the lower likelihood of 
school participation for 16 to 18 year-old males, and can account for 60 percent of the 
lower likelihood of school participation for 12 to 15 year-old males. For 12 to 15 
year-old females, there was no significant effect of migration on school attendance,   26
but housework can account for the size of the point estimate. For 16 to 18 year-old 
females, the increase in housework as the main activity more than accounts for the 
decrease in schooling, with a decrease in non-school work also needed to account for 
the large increase in housework. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examined the overall impact of migration on educational attainment in 
rural Mexico. This impact is the sum of three main effects: the effect of remittances 
on the feasible amount of education investment, which is likely to be positive where 
liquidity constraints are binding; the effect of having parents absent from the 
household as a result of migration, which may translate into less parental inputs into 
education acquisition and maybe into more house and farm work by remaining 
household members, including children; and the effect of migration prospects on the 
desired amount of education, which is likely to be negative, as we argued, in the face 
of lower returns to schooling in the U.S. than in Mexico, especially in a context of 
illegal immigration. 
Our results are in line with these predictions. Using historical migration rates 
by state to instrument for current migration, we find evidence of a significant negative 
effect migration on schooling attendance and attainments of 12 to 18 year-old boys 
and of 16 to 18 year-old girls. IV-Censored Ordered Probit results show that living in 
a migrant household lowers the chances of boys completing junior high school (by 22 
percent) and of boys and girls completing high school (by 13 to 15 percent). This is 
consistent with migration increasing the opportunity cost, and lowering the expected 
return to education. However, the negative effect of migration on schooling is 
somewhat mitigated for younger girls with low educated mothers, which is consistent   27
with remittances allowing to relax credit constraints on education investment at the 
lower end of the wealth and income distribution. 
We also examine what children are doing instead of going to school and find 
that living in a migrant household significantly increases the chances of boys 
migrating themselves at all school ages and of older (16 to 18 year-old) girls doing 
housework. Comparison of the marginal effects of migration on school attendance and 
on participation to other activities shows that the observed decrease in schooling of 16 
to 18 year-olds is more than accounted for by current migration of boys and increases 
in housework for girls. This is at an age where work is also an important form of 
human capital accumulation, so it appears that Mexican females in migrant 
households are losing out on both schooling and work. 
To the extent that this reduction in education is a conscious choice of 
individuals in the face of better opportunities abroad, it should be less of a policy 
concern than a restriction on schooling due to liquidity constraints. However, given 
the large literature on positive externalities of education, there may still be some 
concern at this effect of potential migration on schooling incentives. One possible 
policy solution would be to take measures to increase the return to schooling in the 
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Figure 1: School attendance and attainment by age and sex  
     
 
























31  FIGURE 3: REMITTANCE EFFECT ON CHILD SCHOOLING 
 
 
Remittances shift the possible schooling line upwards, increasing education for poorer households. Bold 
line shows the new education choice, bold dashed line shows the old education choice. 
 
FIGURE 4: OVERALL EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON CHILD SCHOOLING 
Figure 4a: Equal but small reduction in unconstrained schooling 
 
 






























32Figure 4b: Equal but larger reduction in unconstrained schooling 
 
 
Bold dotted line shows the original schooling decision, bold solid line shows the new schooling decision 
after migration, which lies entirely below the original levels. 
 
 





Bold dotted line shows the original schooling decision, bold solid line shows the new schooling decision 




















33TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES
Number of
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Household Variables (for households with a child aged 12 to 18)
Proportion of Households with a migrant 12980 0.22 1 0
Proportion of Households with a migrant by census definition 12980 0.13 0.60 0.002
Proportion receiving remittances
1  12301 0.06 0.22 0.02
Percentage share of income from remittances
1 12301 3.83 16.79 14.91 30.87 0.80 7.43
Individual Variables
Years of Schooling of Mother for children aged 12 to 18 20388 3.32 3.20 3.47 2.98 3.28 3.27
Years of Schooling of Males 12 to 15 6537 5.79 2.02 5.94 1.82 5.74 2.08
Years of Schooling of Males 16 to 18 4159 7.10 2.85 7.10 2.73 7.10 2.88
Years of Schooling of Females 12 to 15 6196 5.92 2.05 6.23 1.79 5.83 2.11
Years of Schooling of Females 16 to 18 3489 7.32 2.87 7.52 2.58 7.26 2.96
State level variables
State migration rate in 1924 20388 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.007
Percentage of rural households owning land in 1910 20388 2.283 1.705 2.698 1.514 2.159 1.739
Male School Attendance in 1930 (% of 6 to 10 year olds) 20388 39.39 9.00 39.902 8.153 39.242 9.226
Female School Attendance in 1930 (% of 6 to 10 year olds) 20388 36.84 10.00 38.944 9.264 36.211 10.121
Gini of Household Income in 1960 20388 0.783 0.069 0.778 0.068 0.784 0.069
Number of Schools per 1000 population in 1930 20388 1.100 0.319 0.993 0.305 1.131 0.315
Gini of Years of Schooling for Males 15-20 in 1960 20388 0.554 0.080 0.551 0.087 0.555 0.078
Gini of Years of Schooling for Females 15-20 in 1960 20388 0.573 0.099 0.556 0.100 0.578 0.098
Average Male Years of Schooling in 1960 20388 2.614 0.638 2.671 0.647 2.597 0.635
Average Female Years of Schooling in 1960 20388 2.437 0.745 2.561 0.756 2.400 0.738
Source: own calculation from ENADID 1997 communities with population <100,000 and 50 or more households sampled.
Education Ginis are only reported for communities with 20 or more children in the given age category
TABLE 2: DOES THE HISTORIC NETWORK AFFECT EDUCATION
LEVELS IN NON-MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS?
Dependent Variable: Years of education attained (non-migrant households only)
Males Males Females Females
12 to 15 16 to 18 12 to 15 16 to 18
Living in state with migration rate above median in 1924 0.14 -0.07 0.18 0.27
(1.35) (0.33) (2.24*) (1.50)
T-statistics are in parentheses with standard errors clustered at the state level.
* significant at the 5% level.
Coefficients from OLS regressions which also include age of child, age of child squared, maternal education,
proportion of rural households owning land in 1910, school attendance in 1930, income gini in 1960,
number of schools per 1000 population in 1930, gini of years of schooling in 1960, and mean years of schooling
in 1960 as other controls.
All households Non-migrant households Migrant Households
34Table 3: The Impact of Migration on School Attendance
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
Child is in a Migrant Household -0.036 -0.162 -0.042 -0.217 0.011 -0.090 -0.020 -0.205
(2.04)** (1.69)* (1.67)* (2.21)** (0.44) (1.11) (0.75) (2.49)**
Age of Child -0.108 -0.080 0.383 0.389 -0.348 -0.333 0.431 0.524
(0.66) (0.52) (0.64) (0.63) (1.70)* (1.60) (0.48) (0.55)
Age of Child Squared -0.001 -0.002 -0.014 -0.015 0.008 0.008 -0.016 -0.018
(0.13) (0.32) (0.82) (0.81) (1.10) (1.01) (0.59) (0.65)
Mother's Years of Education 0.031 0.031 0.034 0.033 0.045 0.046 0.053 0.051
(14.52)*** (13.66)*** (10.67)*** (9.53)*** (11.76)*** (12.47)*** (20.25)*** (12.29)***
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 -0.015 -0.010 0.008 0.017 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 0.001
(2.31)** (1.55) (0.86) (1.64) (1.26) (0.67) (0.87) (0.08)
School Attendance in 1930 (6 to 10 year olds)
1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(1.56) (0.83) (0.89) (0.42) (1.00) (0.53) (1.03) (0.28)
Gini of Income in 1960 -0.267 -0.222 -0.278 -0.180 -0.088 -0.028 -0.719 -0.587
(1.60) (1.34) (1.31) (1.10) (0.38) (0.11) (2.68)*** (2.05)**
Number of Schools per 1000 population in 1930 0.149 0.099 0.148 0.082 0.135 0.097 0.096 0.016
(4.12)*** (1.76)* (3.77)*** (1.41) (4.72)*** (2.41)** (2.58)** (0.35)
Gini of Years of Schooling for 15-20 year olds in 1960
1 0.068 0.085 0.375 0.438 0.005 0.020 -0.844 -0.754
(0.18) (0.23) (0.84) (0.98) (0.02) (0.05) (1.83)* (1.50)
Average Years of Schooling in 1960
1 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 -0.008 0.028 0.027 -0.123 -0.118
(0.10) (0.18) (0.29) (0.15) (0.56) (0.50) (2.28)** (1.88)*
Observations 6454 6454 4094 4094 6108 6108 3430 3430
Notes:
1. These variables are for historic male schooling in columns 1-3, and historic female schooling in columns 4-6.
T-statistics are in parentheses with standard errors clustered at the state level.
Instruments are 1924 state-level migration rate
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Males 16 to 18 Males 12 to 15 Females 16 to 18 Females 12 to 15
35Table 4: The Impact of Migration on the Education of Males Aged 12 to 15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Censored IV-Censored
Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered Ordered
OLS 2SLS Probit Probit Probit Probit
Child is in a Migrant Household 0.151 -0.438 0.013 -0.362 -0.037 -0.512
(2.13)* (1.41) (0.30) (2.24)* (0.55) (2.20)**
Age of Child 3.655 3.779 2.094 2.176 0.203 0.376
(6.37)** (6.62)** (5.92)** (6.07)** (0.21) (0.39)
Age of Child Squared -0.113 -0.118 -0.061 -0.064 -0.008 -0.014
(5.26)** (5.49)** (4.64)** (4.80)** (0.22) (0.40)
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.205 0.207 0.128 0.129 0.161 0.163
(18.56)** (18.96)** (22.48)** (23.39)** (11.51)** (11.54)**
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 -0.066 -0.044 -0.039 -0.024 -0.091 -0.070
(1.68) (1.15) (1.70) (1.18) (3.99)** (3.11)**
Male School Attendance in 1930 (6 to 10 year olds) 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.000
(0.42) (1.27) (0.15) (1.26) (1.09) (0.10)
Gini of Income in 1960 -1.305 -1.155 -0.766 -0.673 -1.560 -1.365
(1.76) (1.43) (1.65) (1.46) (2.90)** (2.61)**
Number of Schools per 1000 population in 1930 -0.154 -0.383 -0.092 -0.239 0.240 0.026
(0.96) (1.84) (0.99) (2.12)* (2.01)** (0.17)
Gini of Male Years of Schooling for 15-20 year olds in 1960 -4.336 -4.251 -2.536 -2.486 -2.625 -2.517
(2.92)** (3.19)** (3.05)** (3.19)** (3.08)** (2.99)**
Average Male Years of Schooling in 1960 for 15-20 year olds -0.451 -0.471 -0.249 -0.261 -0.300 -0.313
(2.90)** (2.79)** (3.00)** (3.31)** (2.73)** (2.83)**
Observations 6451 6451 6451 6451 3226 3226
Robust t-statistics in parentheses clustered at the state level.
Instrument is the 1924 state-level migration rate.
Censored ordered probit regressions are carried out on a 50% random sample, and use school attendance as censoring variable.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
36Table 5: The Impact of Migration on the Education of Males Aged 16 to 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Censored IV-Censored
Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered Ordered
OLS 2SLS Probit Probit Probit Probit
Child is in a Migrant Household 0.151 -1.366 0.041 -0.613 -0.012 -0.653
(1.34) (1.99)* (0.87) (2.92)** (0.16) (2.81)**
Age of Child -3.945 -3.921 -1.716 -1.709 -1.137 -1.096
(0.84) (0.82) (0.76) (0.75) (9.41)** (9.11)**
Age of Child Squared 0.120 0.119 0.053 0.053 0.033 0.032
(0.87) (0.84) (0.80) (0.78) (8.15)** (7.70)**
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.340 0.337 0.139 0.138 0.149 0.149
(12.98)** (12.52)** (15.88)** (15.09)** (12.38)** (12.34)**
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 -0.107 -0.043 -0.039 -0.011 -0.022 0.006
(1.98) (0.71) (1.71) (0.55) (1.05) (0.31)
Male School Attendance in 1930 (6 to 10 year olds) -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.001
(0.25) (0.48) (0.40) (0.51) (1.23) (0.26)
Gini of Income in 1960 -2.173 -1.475 -0.793 -0.495 -0.167 0.142
(1.56) (1.04) (1.43) (0.99) (0.35) (0.30)
Number of Schools per 1000 population in 1930 0.483 0.005 0.209 0.004 0.355 0.149
(1.90) (0.01) (2.01)* (0.03) (2.91)** (1.08)
Gini of Male Years of Schooling for 15-20 year olds in 1960 -5.168 -4.690 -1.878 -1.681 -2.295 -2.117
(1.76) (2.13)* (1.58) (2.02)* (2.84)** (2.64)**
Average Male Years of Schooling in 1960 for 15-20 year olds -0.574 -0.528 -0.204 -0.185 -0.218 -0.198
(1.98) (1.95) (1.67) (1.97)* (0.034) (1.92)*
Observations 4094 4094 4094 4094 2047 2047
Robust t-statistics in parentheses clustered at the state level.
Instrument is the 1924 state-level migration rate.
Censored ordered probit regressions are carried out on a 50% random sample, and use school attendance as censoring variable.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
37Table 6: The Impact of Migration on the Education of Females Aged 12 to 15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Censored IV-Censored
Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered Ordered
OLS 2SLS Probit Probit Probit Probit
Child is in a Migrant Household 0.272 -0.225 0.125 -0.205 0.126 -0.307
(3.36)** (0.77) (2.78)** (1.34) (1.53) (1.04)
Age of Child 1.613 1.671 0.748 0.787 0.475 0.477
(2.18)* (2.23)* (1.81) (1.90) (0.21) (0.39)
Age of Child Squared -0.036 -0.038 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016 -0.016
(1.31) (1.36) (0.66) (0.74) (0.19) (0.35)
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.216 0.217 0.144 0.145 0.196 0.198
(25.93)** (24.32)** (23.28)** (23.29)** (13.30)** (13.37)**
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 -0.094 -0.082 -0.060 -0.052 -0.031 -0.020
(3.98)** (2.82)** (3.75)** (3.37)** (1.13) (0.73)
Female School Attendance in 1930 (6 to 10 year olds) 0.002 0.007 -0.000 0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.34) (1.00) (0.13) (0.90) (1.09) (0.11)
Gini of Income in 1960 -1.143 -0.887 -0.665 -0.496 0.323 0.561
(1.61) (1.06) (1.41) (0.98) (0.50) (0.94)
Number of Schools per 1000 population in 1930 0.066 -0.112 0.086 -0.032 0.256 0.098
(0.53) (0.62) (0.95) (0.29) (2.42)** (0.67)
Gini of Female Years of Schooling for 15-20 year olds in 1960 -4.061 -3.969 -2.295 -2.236 -0.798 -0.690
(4.83)** (5.11)** (4.64)** (4.67)** (0.76) (0.68)
Average Female Years of Schooling in 1960 for 15-20 year olds -0.304 -0.305 -0.150 -0.150 0.088 0.087
(2.94)** (2.64)** (2.57)* (2.24)* (0.61) (0.64)
Observations 6107 6107 6107 6107 3053 3053
Robust t-statistics in parentheses clustered at the state level.
Instrument is the 1924 state-level migration rate.
Censored ordered probit regressions are carried out on a 50% random sample, and use school attendance as censoring variable.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
38Table 7: The Impact of Migration on the Education of Females Aged 16 to 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Censored IV-Censored
Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered Ordered
OLS 2SLS Probit Probit Probit Probit
Child is in a Migrant Household 0.338 -1.443 0.098 -0.663 0.037 -0.824
(2.75)* (2.21)* (1.92) (2.83)** (0.48) (3.26)**
Age of Child 0.695 1.354 0.291 0.581 -0.236 0.128
(0.19) (0.33) (0.18) (0.35) (1.62) (0.02)
Age of Child Squared -0.015 -0.034 -0.006 -0.014 0.005 -0.005
(0.14) (0.28) (0.12) (0.29) (1.08) (0.02)
Mother's Years of Schooling 0.418 0.414 0.176 0.176 0.215 0.213
(16.33)** (15.07)** (18.32)** (17.76)** (14.72)** (14.77)**
Proportion of rural households owning land in 1910 -0.140 -0.069 -0.052 -0.021 -0.058 -0.023
(2.07)* (0.83) (1.95) (0.89) (2.27)** (0.91)
Female School Attendance in 1930 (6 to 10 year olds) -0.027 -0.006 -0.012 -0.003 -0.008 0.002
(1.75) (0.39) (1.93) (0.56) (1.72) (0.41)
Gini of Income in 1960 -3.478 -2.477 -1.477 -1.054 -1.30 -0.751
(1.94) (1.21) (2.10)* (1.51) (2.38)** (1.38)
Number of Schools per 1000 population in 1930 0.396 -0.270 0.184 -0.101 0.153 -0.176
(1.23) (0.59) (1.45) (0.70) (1.54) (1.34)
Gini of Female Years of Schooling for 15-20 year olds in 1960 -7.445 -6.971 -2.987 -2.801 -1.846 -1.638
(2.79)** (2.78)** (2.85)** (3.09)** (2.06)** (1.85)
Average Female Years of Schooling in 1960 for 15-20 year olds -0.534 -0.537 -0.218 -0.221 -0.153 -0.152
(1.76) (1.56) (1.86) (1.76) (1.37) (1.33)
Observations 3431 3431 3431 3431 1716 1716
Robust t-statistics in parentheses clustered at the state level.
Instrument is the 1924 state-level migration rate.
Censored ordered probit regressions are carried out on a 50% random sample, and use school attendance as censoring variable.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
39Table 8: Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Models
IV-Censored IV-Censored IV-Censored IV-Censored
IV-Ordered Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered IV-Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
No Schooling 0.009 0.043 0.038 0.044 0.005 0.024 0.030 0.053
(0.004)* (0.014)** (0.004) (0.012)**
1 to 5 years 0.121 0.159 0.127 0.123 0.063 0.106 0.129 0.144
(0.053)* (0.041)** (0.046) (0.042)**
6 years 0.001 0.137 0.078 0.080 0.006 0.117 0.103 0.115
(0.004) (0.030)** (0.006) (0.041)*
7 to 8 years -0.100 0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.052 -0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.045)* (0.003) (0.039) (0.002)
9 years -0.029 -0.225 -0.110 -0.079 -0.021 -0.145 -0.106 -0.122
(0.013)* (0.038)** (0.015) (0.036)**
10 to 11 years -0.002 -0.120 -0.094 -0.039 -0.001 -0.100 -0.110 -0.046
(0.001)* (0.034)** (0.001) (0.042)**
12 years or more n.a. n.a. -0.036 -0.130 n.a. n.a. -0.047 -0.145
(0.013)** (0.017)**
n.a. denotes not applicable, as 12 to 15 year olds have not reached 12 years of schooling.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Males 12 to 15 Males 16 to 18 Females 12 to 15 Females 16 to 18
40Table 9: Interaction of Migration with Mother's Schooling
Males Males Males Males Females Females Females Females
12 to 15 12 to 15 16 to 18 16 to 18 12 to 15 12 to 15 16 to 18 16 to 18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Child is in a Migrant Household -0.201 -0.538 -1.244 -1.741 0.138 -0.520 -0.817 -2.211
(0.52) (1.48) (1.51) (2.16)* (0.31) (1.44) (0.94) (2.53)*
in a Migrant Household *Mother's Years Schooling -0.072 -0.042 -0.098 -0.187
(1.43) (0.34) (1.34) (1.34)
in a Migrant Household * Low Mother's education 0.355 0.796 0.489 1.090
(1.03) (1.43) (1.60) (1.82)
Observations 6451 6451 4093 4093 6107 6107 3431 3431
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regressions also include all controls in Tables 3-6.
41Table 10: Percentage of 12 to 18 year olds doing other activities than schooling
Migrant Non-migrant Migrant Non-migrant Migrant Non-migrant Migrant Non-migrant
Household Household Household Household Household Household Household Household
Percent attending school 70.7 74.8 26.9 32.4 67.0 66.9 24.4 26.8
Percent who have migrated 3.4 0.1 8.2 0.2 2.4 0.1 3.1 0.3
Percent working 39.3 36.8 70.9 69.0 16.5 17.5 33.2 35.4
Percent working and not in school 20.6 19.2 61.3 58.7 9.6 11.2 29.0 30.9
Percent housework as main activity 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.1 23.2 21.8 45.2 40.7
Percent unpaid family workers 25.4 21.7 26.3 21.3 9.0 9.0 8.8 10.2
Table 11: Marginal Effect of being in a Migrant Household on Other Activities of 12 to 18 year olds
Coefficient Z-statistic Coefficient Z-statistic Coefficient Z-statistic Coefficient Z-statistic
Has Migrated themselves 0.022 6.50** 0.073 11.53** 0.018 6.95** 0.023 7.54**
Works    0.040 0.22 -0.087 0.47 -0.095 0.87 -0.203 1.59
Works and is not in school 0.059 0.82 0.002 0.03 -0.058 0.94 -0.149 1.20
Does housework as main activity 0.011 0.62 -0.004 0.31 0.093 2.23* 0.346 3.74**
Is an unpaid family worker 0.010 0.06 0.015 0.08 -0.090 1.11 -0.076 0.85
Coefficients are marginal effects from probit (Migration) and iv-probit (other activities)
Probits contain all controls in Tables 3 through 6
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Males 12 to 15 Males 16 to 18 Females 12 to 15 Females 16 to 18
Males 12 to 15 Males 16 to 18 Females 12 to 15 Females 16 to 18
42